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VAPOR RECOVERY: LAST GASP OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT?
INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1972, the San Diego County Air Pollution Control
District (APCD)1 took a major step toward limiting the amount
of air pollution emitted during storage and transfer of gasoline into
motor vehicle tanks. The APCD required the installation of devices
costing thousands of dollars per service station in order to keep
gasoline vapors from entering the atmosphere. This program
placed the San Diego APCD on a collision course with the major
oil companies, each of which would be required to spend millions
of dollars on its San Diego County operations.
This impending collision emphasizes the importance of two major
issues regarding environmental protection in California. First, the
overlapping jurisdictions of the California environmental protection
agencies have created enough confusion to diminish the effective-
ness of existing air pollution legislation. Federal supervision
through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) further com-
plicates this jurisdictional confusion. Second, disagreement exists
as to the amount of financial burden pollutors must bear for pollu-
tion control equipment.2 This issue is compounded when the equip-
ment either does not exist or is so experimental as to be of dubious
1. A California local Air Pollution Control District is divided into three
parts paralleling the traditional tripartite federal and state government
structure. The legislative branch is the Air Pollution Control Board
(APCB) composed of the county board of supervisors who serve ex officio.
CAL. HLTH & S. COnE § 24220 (West 1967). The executive branch is the
Air Pollution Control Officer (APCO) appointed by the APCB. Id. §§
24222, 24228. The judicial branch is the Air Pollution Control Hearing
Board (APCHB) composed of one attorney qualified to practice in Califor-
nia, one chemical or mechanical engineer, one member of the medical pro-
fession who has specialized in environmental medicine, and two members
of the public and also appointed by the APCB. Id. § 24225 (West Supp.
1975).
2. This question can be restated as follows: To what extent should pol-
lutors be responsible for the development of air-preserving technology?
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effectiveness. This Comment will deal with these two issues as they
relate to the controversy in San Diego County over gasoline vapor
recovery.
Statutory Authority for Air Pollution Control
The Clean Air Act3 requires the Administrator of the EPA to
determine national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards4 in order to protect the public health and welfare.5 Al-
though the Clean Air Act set 1975 as the compliance date for the
standards 6 the Administrator has exercised his authority to extend
this date to 1977 for all states meeting the statutory requirements.
7
The Act places primary responsibility for assuring air quality upon
each state by requiring submission of an implementation plan that
specifies the manner in which national primary and secondary am-
bient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained.8
In order to comply with federal law, the California legislature
requires representatives from each APCD within a natural air basin
to formulate a basinwide air pollution control plan.9 If adopted
by the state, these local plans become part of the state implementa-
tion plan which is sent to the EPA for final approval.
Applicable Ambient Standards
The EPA Administrator, under authority of the Clean Air Act,10
has set ambient air quality standards for various types of air pol-
lutants." Each implementation plan must break down the dif-
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970), which includes the Clean Air Act
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392; the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954; the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub.
L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
4. Ambient air quality standards are defined as "specified concentra-
tions and durations of pollutants which reflect the relationship between the
intensity and composition of pollution to undesirable effects." CAL. HEATH
& S. CODE § 39008.5 (West 1973).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
6. Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (A) (i).
7. Id. § 1857c-5 (e).
8. Id. § 1857c-2(a).
9. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 89270 et seq. (West 1973). San Diego
County encompasses a single air basin.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970).
11. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.3-.11 & apps. A-F (1973).
ferent sources and types of air pollution in order to propose
methods of controlling the problem. The EPA establishes a propor-
tional model for determining the necessary percentage reduction for
each source and type of pollutant in order to meet the standards.
12
According to this model, San Diego County can meet these stand-
ards only if: First, hydrocarbon emissions are reduced to an annual
average of 36,000 tons; second, carbon monoxide emissions are re-
duced to an annual average of 309,000 tons; and third, suspended
particulate emissions are reduced to an annual average of 21,400
tons.'3 These figures represent the maximum' 4 allowable emis-
sions for this county if public health standards are to be improved.
Although the control of carbon monoxide and particulate emissions
are important, this Comment deals primarily with the control of
hydrocarbons.
Hydrocarbons are emitted chiefly from vehicles and from the
storage and transfer of volatile organic compounds such as gasoline.
The San Diego APCD estimates that 86,000 tons of hydrocarbons
will be released into the atmosphere over San Diego County in
1975.15 This amount is 50,000 tons more than the national stand-
ard. Almost 23,000 tons of hydrocarbons are attributable to station-
ary sources,16 15,880 tons to aircraft sources, and approximately
12. 42 C.F.R. § 420.13 (d) (2) (1971) reads as follows:
The proportional model shall be one in which the following equa-
tion is employed to calculate the degree of improvement in air
quality needed for attainment of a national standard:
A-C
X 100 = percent reduction needed
A-B
Where:
A = Existing air quality at the location having the highest
measured or estimated concentration in the region.
B = Background concentration.
C = National standard.
The plan shall show that the control strategy will result in the de-
gree of emission reduction indicated to be necessary by the propor-
tional model
13. OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR Am PoLLuTION CONTROL IN SAN DIEo
CouNTY 2 (1971). This is the implementation plan for the San Diego air
basin.
14. The correlation between air pollution and human illness has been rec-
ognized since 1930. Several hundred persons were subject to respiratory
ailments and sixty-three persons died after a thick fog covered part of the
Meuse River Valley in Belgium. For other disasters see Chass & Feldman,
Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 349, 354 (1954). Air pollution is
also responsible for damage to livestock and crops. Id. at 355.
15. OPERATIONAL PLAN, supra note 13, at 5.
16. Stationary sources include facilities for the storage and transfer of
volatile organic compounds, volatile organic compound water separators,
and organic solvents. Id. at 5-7.
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47,800 tons to motor vehicle sources."' Emission tests have shown
that a reduction of 11,930 tons of hydrocarbon emissions per year 8
can be obtained through a modification of jet engine combustion
chambers.' 9 It is apparent, however, that state environmental
protection agencies must do more than modify jet engines if the
1975 standards are to even be approached.
The Clean Air Act specifically authorizes transportation controls
and limitations on land use.20 The EPA, for example, has pro-
posed a transportation control plan2' for Los Angeles which
would require motorcycle controls, parking surcharges, a parking
management program, and, as a final resort, extensive gasoline ra-
tioning.22 The San Diego County APCD, instead of imposing di-
rect transportation controls, has decided to control hydrocarbon
emissions by implementing a novel procedure known as vapor re-
covery.2
3
The San Diego County APCD was the first environmental protec-
tion agency in the nation to require the installation of vapor recov-
ery equipment at all gasoline service stations above a certain size.
The agency requires that this equipment recover and dispose of
vapors ordinarily lost during the storage and transfer of gaso-
line,24 and the system must have a minimum continuous efficiency
of 90 percent by weight of vapor collected.25 In addition, the sys-
tem must be able to collect 99.1 percent of vapors emitted in 90
17. Id. at 7-9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (B) (1970).
21. This plan was initiated as a response to a court order. See City of
Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 BNA Emvm. REP. CAs. 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
22. 38 Fed. Reg. 31232 (1973).
23. Gasoline vapor collects above the level of the liquid gasoline when
stored under normal conditions (as in a motor vehicle gas tank). When
the gas tank is filled the liquid gasoline displaces the vapor which escapes
into the atmosphere. A vapor recovery system is defined as
a vapor gathering system capable of collecting the hydrocarbon va-
pors and gasses discharged and a vapor disposal system capable
of processing such hydrocarbon vapors and gasses so as to prevent
their emission to the atmosphere, with all tank gauging and sam-
pling devices gastight except when gauging or sampling is taking
place. CAL. H.ATr & S. CoDE § 39068.4 (West 1973).
24. SAN DIEGo Couwzy, CAL., APCD RuLEs & REGULATIONS, Rule 61, 63
(1974).
25. Id. Rule 63.
percent of the number of vehicles fueled.20 According to the
APCD, compliance with these rules would result in a reduction of
over 20 percent of all hydrocarbons emitted into the atmosphere
in San Diego County.
2 7
The Controversy
Initially the San Diego County APCD endorsed the installation
of a vapor displacement or "balance" system2s as a proper method
of complying with the rules. 2 9 Several major oil companies op-
posed this system on the grounds that it was prohibitively ex-
pensive and scientifically unfeasible.30 The San Diego APCD even-
tually conceded that the balance systems would be inadequate in
achieving APCD requirements. Nevertheless, the agency decided
it was necessary to force the development of vapor systems which
would comply with the rules. As a result of this decision, several
private developers designed vacuum systems and other equipment
which allegedly would meet the APCD requirements. 31 The oil
companies argued that the new equipment was twice as expensive
as the balance systems and that the necessary technology for com-
pliance with the rules was actually nonexistent or inadequate. The
APCD ultimately required the installation of the vacuum sys-
tems. 32 The oil companies refused. As the January 1, 1974 dead-
26. Id.
27. OPERATIONAL PLAN, supra note 13, at 5.
28. The vapor balance vapor recovery system consists simply of a tight
fitting nozzle (to keep the vapors from escaping through the space around
the pump nozzle) and a tube (which carries the vapor to the service sta-
tion's storage facility). The vapor remains there until a gasoline delivery
truck collects it (by the same displacement method) and takes it back to
the refinery where it is processed. Vapor is processed either by condensing
it back into liquid gasoline or by burning it.
29. Conversation with Tom Wilson, chemical engineer for the San Diego
County APCD in San Diego, California, July 8, 1975.
30. CONTROL OF HYDROCARBON VAPOR LossEs DURING THE MARKETING OF
GASOLINE AT SERVICE STATIONS, A Study by Standard Oil of California, June
6, 1972.
31. The vacuum vapor recovery system is essentially a balance system
with two important additions. First, the system uses a vacuum pump to
draw the vapor out of the motor vehicle tank rather than relying on dis-
placement. Second, the vapor is processed before it is returned to the serv-
ice station's storage facility.
32. The EPA requires the use of a permit system to insure compliance
with air pollution laws. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1973). In San Diego County
the system is divided into two parts: The Authority to Construct is issued
only after the APCO is convinced that the equipment will sufficiently re-
duce the issuance of air contaminants. The APCO bases his decision on
the plans for the equipment which must be submitted by the builder. After
construction the APCO may grant a Permit to Operate if he is convinced
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line for compliance approached, it became apparent that hundreds"3
of service stations in the county would be in violation of the rules
and subject to fines as high as $500 a day for each violation.
3 4
Faced with massive noncompliance, the San Diego County Air
Pollution Control Board35 twice extended the compliance date.38
The APCD eventually granted variances 37 to most of the oil com-
panies and independent service stations, thereby permitting the in-
stallation of the inadequate vapor balance system. In fact, the oil
companies have agreed to install the balance system although they
had previously rejected it as unworkable.3 8 The APCD, however,
has asserted that the balance system is at best a stop-gap measure
and upon expiration of the variances full compliance would be re-
quired.
On August 30, 1974, the San Diego Superior Court issued a prelim-
inary injunction, restraining the APCD from enforcing the vapor
requirements against Atlantic Richfield Service Stations in San
Diego County.39 Two other oil companies have also filed suit and
obtained temporary restraining orders.4 0 At stake in these cases
is the fate of an air pollution strategy that may define the extent
of compliance with national air pollution limits. The outcome of
the controversy will affect the rest of the nation.
that the equipment will perform in accordance with APCD rules. SAN
D-no CouNTy, CAL., APCD RuLEs Amn RurLATIows Rule 10 (1974).
33. Of the 849 service stations in San Diego County operated by major
oil companies, only 31 received authority to construct and only 3 received
a permit to operate a vapor recovery system during 1973. See annual report
in 2 Am POLLUTION Q. at 2 (1973).
34. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39261 (West 1973). An APCD also has the
power to issue an order of abatement, the violation of which can result in
a fine as high as $6000 per day. Id. § 39260.
35. See note 1 supra.
36. The extensions were to June 30, 1974 and December 1, 1974.
37. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24291 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). Variances
were granted subject to the condition that the receiver of each variance sub-
mit compliance schedules showing in detail how the APCD rules will be
met by the time the variance expires. Id. § 24296.
38. There was one significant exception. In July, 1974, Shell Oil Co. an-
nounced that in spite of its objections it would develop and install the re-
quired vacuum systems at all its service stations.
39. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. APCD of San Diego County, No. 356319
(Super. Ct., San Diego County, filed July 29, 1974).
40. Mobil Oil Co. v. San Diego County APCD, No. 372634 (Super. Ct.,
San Diego County, filed Oct. 10, 1975); Union Oil Co. v. San Diego County
Bd. of Supervisors, No. 372290 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, filed Oct. 2,
1975).
INTERAGENcY DELAY
The Clean Air Act provides that primary ambient air quality
standards be met as expediently as practicable, but in no case later
than 1975, and that secondary ambient air quality standards be met
within a reasonable time.41 . Although the provisions for compli-
ance extensions 42 to 1977 have been exercised, it is apparent that
time is the essential element.43 In spite of the congressional intent
to clean the air as quickly as possible, a tri-level administrative
structure of environmental regulation has led to delays which make
attainment of national health standards uncertain. In the absence
of the necessary appropriations enabling the EPA directly to en-
force its regulations, every effort should be made to reduce the
interagency uncertainty which has deferred the right of the public
to breathe clean air. This section will discuss how the structure
has become cumbersome and time consuming in California.
ARB vs. APCD
The California Air Pollution Control Districts Act of 1947'4 orig-
inally endowed the county based APCDs with broad powers of con-
trol over all sources of air pollution within their boundaries."
Only after the expenditure of millions of dollars on the control of
stationary source air pollution, and the realization that the air had
remained unhealthy, was it discovered that motor vehicles were a
significant air pollution source.4 6 Although the technological
problems at that time were great, California embarked on a pro-
gram to curb motor vehicle pollution.47 As other states became
interested in controlling emissions through the regulation of new
motor vehicles, the automobile industry appealed for uniform regu-
lation.48 California alone is exempt from the federal government's
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (A) (1970).
42. Id. §§ 1857c-5(e), 1857c-5(f).
43. See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 3 (1973); S. REP. No.
91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
44. CAL.. HFALTH & S. CODE § 24198 et seq. (West 1967).
45. Whenever the air pollution control board finds that the air in the
air pollution control district is so polluted as to cause any discom-
fort or property damage at intervals to a substantial number of in-
habitants of the district, the air pollution control board may make
and enforce such orders, rules, and regulations as will reduce the
amount of air contaminants released within the district. Id. §
24262.
46. See Kennedy, The Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control With Par-
ticular Reference to the County of Los Angeles, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 373, 374
(1954).
47. See Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 349,
368-69 (1954).
48. See Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Responses to
Felt Necessities, 22 HAsT. L.J. 661, 674-75 (1971).
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uniform regulations over new motor vehicles because of its prior
leadership and stricter regulations in this area.49 The Mulford-
Carrel Air Resources Act 50 created the Air Resources Board
(ARB) to provide for consistent statewide motor vehicle regula-
tion.51 Under Mulford-Carrel, the APCD Act was modified to
prohibit APCD regulation over vehicular sources of air pollu-
tion.5 2 The Air Resources Board currently has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over vehicular emissions and the APCD regulates nonvehicular
or stationary sources of air pollution. For most purposes, the ve-
hicular/nonvehicular distinction provides for a rational distribution
of authority between the ARB and the APCDs. In the areas of
fuel regulation and vapor recovery, however, the statutory distinc-
tion alone has been found insufficient in resolving this jurisdic-
tional issue.
The oil companies have taken advantage of the ARB's disinclina-
tion to regulate fuel content and vapor emissions by asserting that
the APCDs have no authority to do so. 53 There are no specific
statutory provisions for the regulation of lead content in gasoline
or for the installation of vapor recovery devices at service stations.
The oil companies have characterized these activities as the control
of vehicular sources of air pollution so as to preclude APCD ac-
tion.5 4 Lead content limitations are designed to minimize a ve-
hicular source of air pollution via regulation of its stationary source
origin. Thus, APCD lead regulations may be viewed as an attempt
to regulate vehicular sources of air pollution.5 5 Similarly, the
Mulford-Carrel Act, in its definitions of "fuel evaporative loss" and
"fuel system," implies that the control of any vapor loss from the
fuel tank of a motor vehicle is the regulation of a vehicular source
49. Id. at 675-76.
50. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39000 et seq. (West 1973).
51. Id. § 39012.
52. See, e.g., id. §§ 24224i 24260 (West Supp. 1975).
53. Compare Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of At-
lantic Richfield Company's Motion for a Stay Pending Final Judgment and
a Preliminary Injunction in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. APCD of San Diego
County, No. 356319 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, filed July 29, 1974), with
Amici Curiae Brief of the California Attorney General and Air Resources,
Board in Support of Respondent San Diego Air Pollution Control District,
id.
54. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Memorandum 25, supra note 53.
55. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County APCD, 14 Cal. 3d
411, 414, 534 P.2d 1329, 1330, 121 Cal. Rptr. 249, 250 (1975).
of air pollution.56 The Mulford-Carrel Act clearly appears to
grant the ARB exclusive authority to regulate vehicular sources
of air pollution. Its declaration of policy states the necessity for
providing statewide motor vehicle emission standards." Other
provisions support this policy: "Local and regional authorities have
the primary responsibility for the control of air pollution except
for the emissions from motor vehicles. These authorities may con-
trol emissions from nonvehicular sources .... "158 This line of rea-
soning supports the conclusion that only the ARB may regulate fuel
content and vapor recovery.
Local APCDs have attempted to construe the Air Pollution Con-
trol Act and the Mulford-Carrel Act so as to avoid the vehicular/
nonvehicular distinction. The argument for exclusive APCD au-
thority assumes that the Air Pollution Control Act granted the
APCDs broad police powers5 9 for the protection of the public from
the adverse effects of air pollution.60 The ARB, on the other hand,
acquired only that authority expressed in the Mulford-Carrel Act.
Because the Mulford-Carrel Act provides only for ARB regulation
of gasoline volability and unsaturation0 ' and for installation of
vapor recovery devices on automobiles, 2 the argument concludes
that the APCDs must have the residual authority to regulate fuel
lead content and to require the installation of vapor recovery de-
vices on gasoline pumps.63 This argument will ultimately be re-
56. "Fuel evaporative loss" is defined as "vaporized fuel emitted into the
atmosphere from the fuel system of a motor vehicle." CAL. HEALTH & S.
CODE § 39088 (West 1973). "Fuel System" is defined as "the combination
of fuel tank, fuel lines, and carburetor, or fuel injector, and includes all
vents and fuel evaporative emission control systems or devices." Id. §
39089. The only other motor vehicle emissions defined are "crankcase emis-
sions" and "exhaust emissions." Id. §§ 39086, 39087.
57. Id. § 39011. APCDs have only two specific powers to control motor
vehicle emissions. First, they may establish performance standards for air
pollution control equipment designed for installation on motor vehicles and
prohibit the sale or installation of any equipment which fails to meet these
standards. Id. § 24263.7 (West 1967). Second, they may require the instal-
lation of devices to control the emissions from the crankcase and exhaust
of cars manufactured between 1955 and 1965 if such devices are certified
or accredited by the State ARB. Id. § 24263.8 (West Supp. 1975).
58. Id. § 39012 (West 1973).
59. See 6 E. McQUiLLIN, MUICIPAL CORPORATIONS 444 (3d ed. 1969) (po-
lice powers in general).
60. See note 45 supra.
61. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39051.1, 39051.2 (West 1973).
62. Id. §§ 39093-94, 39108.
63. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County APCD, 14 Cal. 3d
411, 416, 534 P.2d 1329, 1331-32, 121 Cal. Rptr. 249, 251-52 (1975); ARB Brief
9-10, supra note 53.
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jected because there is no compelling reason to construe the ARB's
powers so narrowly.64
Until recently the California courts have consistently followed
neither rationale resulting in a lapse of fuel content regulation over
the past four years. In Environmental Defense Fund v. California
Air Resources Board,65 the court found that the ARB's "power
to set emission standards is limited to devices or modifications that
are part of a vehicle's engine structure and does not include the
power to regulate fuel composition. . . .,"66 Conversely, the appel-
late court in Western Oil and Gas Association v. Orange County
Air Pollution Control District67 held that the APCD did not have
the authority, even indirectly, to regulate the lead emissions from
motor vehicles.68
Fortunately, the California Supreme Court, in upholding the
Western Oil decision, 69 finally ended the uncertainty by formally
disapproving the Environmental Defense Fund decision. Although
the court confirmed the utility of the vehicular/nonvehicular dis-
tinction, it also indicated that other considerations were equally ap-
plicable.
We conclude ... that in the light of practical considerations, the
purposes of the Mulford-Carrel Act, and the provisions of that act,
the Legislature intended to accord that power [fuel regulation] to
the ARB.70
In holding that the ARB necessarily has the authority to regulate
what goes into gasoline in order to regulate what comes out of
motor vehicles, the court took the first step toward recognizing that
not all sources of pollutants may be characterized as exclusively
64. See generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968) (FCC may regulate cable television even though cable television did
not exist when the FCC was chartered); Ralph's Grocery Store v. Reimel,
69 Cal. 2d 172, 444 P.2d 79, 70 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1968).
65. 30 Cal. App. 3d 829, 106 Cal. Rptr. 59a (1973).
66. Id. at 834, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
67. 40 Cal. App. 3d 590 (opinion omitted), 115 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1974), va-
cated, 14 Cal. 3d 411, 534 P.2d 1329, 121 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).
68. Id.
69. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County APCD, 14 Cal. 3d 411,
534 P.2d 1329, 121 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).
70. Id. at 415, 534 P.2d at 1331, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (emphasis added).
The practical considerations discussed related to the inability of pre-1970
cars to use unleaded fuel. Id. at 417-18 n.6, -534 P.2d at 1332 n.6, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 252 n.6.
vehicular or nonvehicular. Although fuel regulation is aimed at
controlling motor vehicle emissions, it is a direct control of oil re-
fineries which can only be considered as stationary sources of air
pollution. Similarly, the hydrocarbons collected during vapor re-
covery are equally attributable to the stationary gasoline pump
which displaces them as to the automobile gas tank which stores
therm71 Because of this dual nature, emphasis should be placed
on practical considerations and the purpose behind the Mulford-
Carrel Act to make a rational division of authority.
Gasoline marketing should be viewed as a continuous operation.
Control of the loss of vapors during gasoline marketing operations
may occur at four stages: 1) The bulk storage terminal; 2) the
loading and unloading of the transport tanker truck; 3) the service
station storage tank; and 4) the transfer of fuel to motor vehicles.
The APCDs have specific authority to regulate vapor loss during
the first three stages72 and the practical effect of having the ARB
regulate the fourth stage would be to divide control over gasoline
marketing operations between the APCDs and the ARB. In
Western Oil, the court used an analogous argument against such
division of authority.
[T]he ARB has been authorized by the Legislature to regulate the
composition of gasoline in two specific respects . .. and without
some solid basis compelling uj to hold that the Legislature intended
to divide authority over fuel content between the districts
[APCDs] and the ARB, we should not presume such an intent.73
Because there is no compelling reason for a division of authority
in the regulation of vapor loss, the APCDs should be able to require
vapor recovery.
The purpose behind the vehicular/nonvehicular distinction in the
Mulford-Carrel Act is to avoid conflicting regulatory requirements
for automobile emission equipment. A local rule requiring the in-
stallation of air pollution devices on motor vehicles would be inef-
fective as an air pollution strategy because motor vehicles are not
restricted to intracounty travel. Vapor emissions occurring during
the fueling process, however, are strictly a local phenomenon, occur-
ring only at gasoline service stations. Thus, APCD regulation of
vapor recovery during the fueling process is consistent with the
purpose of the Mulford-Carrel Act.
The time needed to produce and install vapor recovery units adds
a note of urgency to a determination in favor of the APCDs. Be-
71. See note 23 supra.
72. CAL. HAvmrH & S. CoDy § 39068.2 (West 1973).
73. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County APCD, 14 Cal. 3d 411, 417,
534 P.2d 1329, 1332, 121 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (1975).
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cause of oil company resistance, only a few companies have devel-
oped the necessary equipment.74 They will produce only small
quantities of this equipment as long as the fate of the San Diego
APCD vapor recovery rules remains uncertain. Even if enough of
the devices were currently available, it takes approximately one
week per service station for installation.7 5 Whether the goal is
to meet national health standards by 1977 or later, expedient
implementation of the vapor recovery rules is necessary.76 The
uncertainty over which agency has the authority to require vapor
recovery may result in a considerable loss of time.77 Although the
arguments favor APCD jurisdiction, both agencies should exercise
their authority in the vapor recovery area to avoid further delay.78
EPA Regulation
Further time-consuming complications arise because of the am-
biguous relationship between state and federal enforcement of the
Clean Air Act. Congress has placed the primary responsibility for
enforcement of national health standards on the states79 by requir-
ing state implementation plans.80 Each plan must demonstrate
how the state intends to achieve and maintain national standards81
and must include assurances that the state will provide adequate
personnel and funds82 to accomplish these objectives. 83 The EPA
74. Conversation with Tom Wilson, chemical engineer for the San Diego
County APCD, in San Diego, California, July 8, 1975.
75. San Diego County APCD Comments on Gasoline Vapor Control at
31 (issued by EPA 1974).
76. See text accompanying notes 10-19 supra.
77. Presumably the oil companies will attack ARB authority next. Tele-
phone conversation with Rich Sommerville, Assistant Air Pollution Control
Officer for the San Diego County APCD, Oct. 15, 1975.
78. The ARB may act if an APCD does not.
If the board finds, pursuant to Section 39054 that any rule or reg-
ulation of a local or regional authority submitted to it will not
achieve applicable air quality standards, it may repeal such rule
or regulation and promulgate a rule or regulation which it finds
would achieve such standards. Such rule or regulation shall have
the same force and effect as a rule or regulation adopted by the
local or regional authority, and shall be enforced by the local or
regional authority. CAL. HEATH & S. CODE § 39052(f) (West 1973).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (1970).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. It is interesting to note that Congress expected the states to bear most
of the administrative expenses of cleaning the air.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (F) (1970).
Administrator has the affirmative duty to disapprove all or part
of each state plan which does not meet the requirements of the
Clean Air Act.8 4 Although the Administrator must promulgate
substitute provisions for those disapproved sections of the state
plans,8 5 there is no mechanism in the Clean Air Act by which he
can compel the states to enforce either the parts he approved or
his substitutions.8 " Under these circumstances the EPA would
have to rely upon its concurrent authority to enforce the state im-
plementation plans. 87 The problem is that Congress has not appro-
priated the necessary funds for EPA enforcement on the local
level.88 In the light of this current federal funding practice,
prompt enforcement activity would be impractical.
If the EPA decides to enforce its regulations in some local areas, it
may be delayed by state court rulings. The Clean Air Act provides
for judicial review if the action is brought within 30 days of the
promulgation of the EPA's substitute implementation plan,89 but
does not contain the necessary language to require that adjudica-
tory or legislative-type hearings be held.90
In Getty Oil v. Ruckleshaus,91 the petitioner obtained an injunc-
tion forestalling state enforcement of a rule prohibiting certain
utilities from burning high sulfur fuel. While the petitioner sought
an administrative appeal, the EPA commenced enforcement pro-
ceedings.9 2 The petitioner brought this action to restrain the EPA
pending its appeal.9 3 The federal court refused to grant an injunc-
tion on the ground that the petitioner had not brought the action
within the 30-day time limit set by the Clean Air Act.
9 4
In Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,9 5 however, the petitioner filed
84. Id. § 1857c-5(a) (2).
85. Id. § 1857c-5 (c).
86. The EPA may put pressure on the states by threatening to cut off
federal funds granted for the support of air pollution planning and control
programs. Id. § 1857c(b).
87. The EPA may issue compliance orders or bring civil actions against
any person in violation of an approved state implementation plan. Id. §
1857c-8.
88. The actual increase in EPA's budget for 1975 is only three percent
over 1974 which does not even keep pace with inflation. Ayres, Enforce-
ment of Air Pollution Controls on Stationary Sources under the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 4 EcOLOGY L.Q. 441, 465 n.75 (1975).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970).
90. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 296 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. 467 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 357-58 n.14.
95. 481 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973).
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within the 30-day period and was granted a delay in EPA action.
[T]o expose the companies to the risk of punishment without af-
fording them full occasion to express their objections to the state
implementation plan is fundamentally unfair. Therefore, this
Court instructs the EPA that it must either (a) refrain from impos-
ing any penalties on these companies during the pendency of their
state administrative and judicial actions, so long as such actions
are pursued by the companies in good faith and with due diligence,
or (b) afford the companies a limited legislative hearing.9 6
This federal-state interagency delay is significant in the area of
vapor recovery because the EPA has recently announced that 37,000
service stations in eight metropolitan areas of the country will be
expected to install vacuum vapor recovery systems by 1977.97 Be-
cause of the Duquesne Light decision and the necessary production
and installation periods, further delay can be expected.
FORcING TECHNOLOGY
The concept of forcing technology was introduced into the Clean
Air Act to place protection of the public health above economic
considerations.
The protection of the public health . . . will require major action
throughout the Nation. Many facilities will require major invest-
ments in new technology and new processes. Some facilities will
need altered operating procedures or a change of fuels. Some fa-
cilities may be closed.
The Administrator is expected to press for the development and
application of improved technology rather than be limited by that
which exists. In other words, standards should be a function of
the degree of control required, not the degree of technology avail-
able today.9S
Because air pollution technology was not sufficiently developed
to meet the goals of clean air, two99 responses were required. First,
96. Id. at 10 (emphasis by the court).
97. See text accompanying notes 151-55 infra.
98. S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-24 (1970) (emphasis
added).
99. A third method was available until the court in Sierra Club v. Ruck-
elshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C. 1972), issued an injunction prohibiting
the EPA from approving state implementation plans "which allow pollution
levels of clean air to rise to the secondary standard level of pollution.. .. "
Except for this policy of nondegradation a state could attempt to redistrib-
the development of emission controls was emphasized through fed-
erally funded research programs' 00' and by setting strict compli-
ance dates for achieving emission standards.10' The threat of
closing noncomplying facilities should have been an incentive for
industry to provide sufficient investments to develop the requisite
technology. Second, the adoption of land use and transportation
controls was authorized10 2 to meet the compliance dates should
the current emission controls prove insufficient. 0 3 The threat of
separating Americans from their automobiles should have been an
added incentive for transportation related industries to solve the
pollution problems of their products. As discussed below, industry
has not contributed significantly to the development of emission
controls. Congress has compounded this industrial foot-dragging
by granting extensions instead of imposing sanctions for noncompli-
ance..
0 4
The strategy of forced technology has clearly lost its impetus.
The courts are currently deciding the fate of forced technology in
the area of vapor recovery. This section will discuss the resistance
to the strategy with an emphasis on the ability of the courts to
affect this policy.
Resistance to Land Use and Transportation Controls
Land use and transportation controls are methods of curtailing
the use of pollution emitting sources. Most of these controls are
intended to create disincentives to the excessive use of automobiles
through the regulation of complex sources of emissions. The EPA
has defined a complex source of emissions as "a facility that has
or leads to secondary or adjunctive activity which emits or may
emit a pollutant for which there is a national standard."' 05  Ex-
ute polluting sources to parts of the state where pollution is not a problem.
There is some evidence that even pollution levels at or below the national
standards may be harmful.
Actually only a few areas of the country violate all the national second-
ary standards for air quality. Wall Street J., Feb. 14, 1974, at 4, col. 1, (pac.
ed.). (The Wall Street Journal is bound in the eastern ed.).
The policy of nondegradation has been upheld. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 4 BNA ENVIR. REP. CAs. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally
divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857b (1970).
101. Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (A).
102. Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (B).
103. Whether emission controls must be declared insufficient before
transportation controls may be implemented has not been settled. See
Comment, Transportation Control: An Urban Reality, 12 HousT. L. REV.
689, 692-96 (1975).
104. See text accompanying notes 114-27 infra.
105. 38 Fed. Reg. 6279 (1973).
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amples of complex sources are shopping centers, sports arenas,
drive-in theatres, parking lots and garages.1 6 Although these fa-
cilities actually emit little pollution, the associated motor vehicle
pollution is significant.1'07 In addition, the EPA has suggested
that the establishment of bus and car pool lanes, reductions in off-
street parking, limitations on motorcycles, parking surcharges and
the prevention of further increases in gasoline consumption may
also be necessary. 08 The authority for such controls can be found
in the Clean Air Act itself. The Act requires that state implementa-
tion plans include
emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with
such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to
insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary
standards, including but not limited to, land use and transportation
controls .... 109
There has been frequent litigation over when such controls may
be required." 0 There has also been a serious deterioration of
congressional intent in allowing the EPA to implement drastic so-
cietal transformation in the name of clean air. The Energy Supply
and Environmental Coordination Act (ESECA),"' purportedly
enacted to provide for conservation of our country's energy re-
sources, specifically prohibits the EPA from requiring the imposi-
tion of parking surcharges without explicit congressional ap-
proval." 2 The House of Representatives attempted to include
a special provision in EPA's appropriation bill forbidding EPA from
requiring parking surcharges or otherwise regulating parking facili-
ties." 3 Although that provision did not appear in the bill as
passed, it is indicative of a growing dissatisfaction with the use of
transportation controls to meet the requirements of the Clean Air
Act.
106. Id. at 6279-80.
107. Id.
108. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31232 (1973).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (B) (1970).
110. See note 108 supra.
111. Pub. L. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5 (c) (2) (B) (Supp. 1975). Since disincentives
to use motor vehicles would result in an energy saving as well as a reduc-
tion in the level of air pollution it is difficult to reconcile this provision
with the purpose of ESECA.
113. H.R. REP. No. 1379, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Resistance to Emission Controls
Since the late 1960s, state and local air pollution agencies have
compelled utilities to reduce their contribution to air pollution. 114
Instead of installing flue gas desulfurization equipment to clean the
smokestack emissions before reaching the atmosphere, the utilities
converted from coal to burning less polluting fuels such as oil and
gas.115 Even as it became apparent that the world's oil and gas
resources were not limitless, privately owned utilities conducted lit-
tle research into methods of burning coal cleanly.1 16 The utility
industry demanded unreasonable and unprecedented guarantees
from the private developers of emission control equipment. 117
After the oil embargo,"18 demands for reconversion of power
plants to coal become widespread, but there was no longer enough
time to meet the compliance dates of the Clean Air Act through
emission controls. Congress reacted by extending the Clean Air
Act deadlines to 1978 for power plants converting to coal. 10
Resistance to pollution technology has not been confined to the
utility industry. The bulk of air pollution in dispersed metropoli-
tan areas such as Los Angeles and San Diego is attributable to
motor vehicle exhaust emissions. 20 All 1975 and later model
automobiles were supposed to meet 1975 emission standards through
the use of catalytic converters. 121 The largest automobile manu-
facturers, however, applied for the one-year suspension1 22 pro-
vided for in the Clean Air Act.' 23 As a result, the EPA set interim
114. Pollution from utilities consists of mostly sulfur oxides.
115. At that time conversion to oil or gas was cheaper than the installa-
tion of such equipment. Now that the prices of oil and gas are rising the
installation of flue gas desulfurization equipment may become more attrac-
tive.
116. EPA, REPORT OF TR HEARING PANEL, NATIONAL PuBLic HEARINGs ON
POWER PLANT COMPLIANCE WITH SULFUR DioXE AIR POLLUTION REGULA-
TONS 26 (1974).
117. Id. at 45-46.
118. This action by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
can be expected to affect air pollution policies far into the future.
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-10 (c) (2) (C) (Supp. 1975).
120. 38 Fed. Reg. 31239 (1973).
121. Comment, The Automobile Controversy-Federal Control of Vehicu-
lar Emissions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 661, 671 (1975).
122. The companies were Volvo, Chrysler, General Motors, Ford, and In-
ternational Harvester.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (b) (5) (1970). The EPA originally rejected the
applications but was overruled by the court in International Harvester v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The auto industry succeeded
in persuading the court to take possible economic hardships into considera-
tion. Id. at 641.
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standards and required that catalytic converters be included only
on new cars sold in California. 24
The pressure on Congress caused by the energy crisis had its ef-
fect on motor vehicle emission compliance dates as well as those
of stationary source emissions. ESECA amended the Clean Air Act
so as to suspend its original hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide
emission requirements for 1977 model year automobiles.125 The
motivation behind these provisions of ESECA could not have been
solely the conservation of energy resources. The House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee Report on ESECA stated that
adverse fuel economy would deter consumer purchasing of new
automobiles resulting in greater retention of old automobiles with
inefficient pollution control devices .... [Tihis might lead to a
situation whereby denial of a suspension would result in greater
total actual emissions of all cars in use than would be the case if
a suspension were authorized.' 26
This rationale is in conflict, however, with announcements by Gen-
eral Motors, made several months earlier, to the effect that fuel
economy gains of 20 percent could be expected over 1974 autos due
to the installation of catalytic converters. 27
Judicial Influence
The courts are reviewing the San Diego APCD's technology-forc-
ing activities. Most of the oil companies are willing to install ver-
sions of the vapor balance system. 28 The San Diego APCD has
determined that the balance system cannot meet the 90 percent re-
covery requirements and that the oil companies must install the
more expensive vacuum systems. 2 9 To reach this conclusion the
124. 38 Fed. Reg. 22474 (1973).
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857f-1 (b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1975).
126. H.R. REP. No. 93-1013, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
127. Statement of General Motors President Edward N. Cole, Hearings
on Compliance with Title 1I (Auto Emissions Standards) of the Clean Air
Act, Before the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 120-
210 (1973); Statement of General Motors Vice-President, Environmental
Activities Staff, Earnest S. Starkman, Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight
-1973, Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 363-73 (1973).
128. See text accompanying notes 28-40 supra.
129. The vapor balance system has many factors working against it.
Since this system works on the principle of forced displacement the vapor
APCD had to make findings of fact that the vacuum systems would
be significantly more effective than the balance systems and that
the vacuum systems were technologically feasible.18 0 The oil com-
panies dispute both these findings and maintain that an installation
requirement for vacuum systems is an unwarranted exercise of
police power.18 '
Because the vacuum systems still have technical and safety prob-
lems,8 2 the applicable scope of review of the APCD's findings may
be determinative. The federal courts have traditionally adhered
to the theory of limited agency review.88 The California courts,
however, have indicated that they will exercise greater supervision
over agency findings of fact.8 4 These different standards of re-
will take the path of least resistance. For the following reasons the path
of least resistance is rarely through the vapor recovery system and back
into the storage tank: 1) The lengths of piping leading from the nozzle
back to the storage tank create resistance to the passage of the vapor. 2)
Gasoline composition, agitation during fueling, differences in temperature
between the storage and the motor vehicle tank, and seasonable changes in
gasoline volatility combine to create a greater volume of vapor than the
volume of liquid added during the fueling process. This excess vapor will
either escape through the vent in the storage tank or will create a greater
pressure there than in the motor vehicle tank.
Besides through the balance system there are three other possible vapor
paths which provide less resistance: 1) The gasoline tanks of a majority
of the vehicles currently on the road have open vents leading to the outside.
If pressure in the storage tank is great enough vapor will escape through
these vents during fueling. 2) Greater pressure in the system than in the
atmosphere inevitably produces leaks in the system. 3) A gap between the
nozzle and the tank fill pipe of 1/32 inch or more will result in most of
the vapor being lost. The degree of fit at the tank/nozzle interface repre-
sents the greatest engineering problem. The disparate designs for gasoline
tank fill pipes make attainment of a tight fit very difficult. There has been
little effort to standardize fill pipe designs by automobile manufacturers.
Barnard R. McEntre, Air Pollution Engineer, San Diego County APCD,
Problems of Hydrocarbon Emissions from Service Stations (1973); San
Diego County APCD Comments on Gasoline Vapor Control at 3-7 (issued
by EPA 1974).
130. The APCD had already found that 90 percent recovery of hydrocar-
bons during the fueling process would be necessary to approach the ambient
air quality standards set by EPA. See text accompanying notes 11-29 supra.
131. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Memorandum, supra note 53.
132. Because the vacuum systems are more complex than the balance
systems they are subject to more frequent breakdowns. There is also the
possibility that the vacuum systems will draw in too much air thereby cre-
ating an explosive mixture of gasoline vapors and oxygen.
133. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. Rsv. 55 (1965). See also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-
A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 783 (1966); Berger, Adminis-
trative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Davis, Admin-
istrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REy. 814 (1966).
134. See, e.g., Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr.
234 (1971).
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view may cause inconsistent results between federal and state
courts on the vapor recovery issue.
If the EPA threatens enforcement for failure to install vacuum
systems, the oil companies will have to challenge this action in fed-
eral court.135 In this situation, the courts have used the review
standard applied by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe. 3 6 A reviewing court shall not set aside
an agency finding unless "the actual choice made [by the agency]
was . . . 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law."37 The Court in Overton Park
explained what such a ruling involved.
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry
into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard
of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency.138
As long as the agency's conclusions of availability of requisite tech-
nology are founded on supportable data and methodology and meet
minimal standards of rationality, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.'
39
In the California courts, where several actions challenging the
APCD are pending, agency review is less restricted. Generally, in
reviewing the decisions of a local administrative agency the trial
court's inquiry is confined to determining whether there was sub-
stantial evidence before the agency to support its findings. 140 In
Bixby v. Pierno,'4 ' however, the California Supreme Court held
that a court must conduct a full and independent review of a case
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (b) (1970). The action must be brought within
30 days of the date of the promulgation or approval of the state implemen-
tation plan. See text accompanying notes 93-101 supra.
136. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
137. Id. at 416, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. V. 1969). See Texas v. EPA,
499 F.2d 289, 296 (5th Cir. 1974); Buckeye Power Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162,
170-71 (6th Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 505-
07 (4th Cir. 1973).
138. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citations omitted).
139. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974).
140. See, e.g., Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal.
3d 64, 76, 496 P.2d 840, 847, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768, 775 (1972).
141. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
if action by an administrative agency affects a "fundamental vested
right."14
2
In determining whether the right is fundamental the courts do not
alone weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect of it in human
terms and the importance of it to the individual in the life situa-
tion.143
This broad language was applied in Strumsky v. San Diego County
Employees Retirement Association 144 to determine that the right
to receive a more lucrative survivor allowance than awarded was
fundamental and vested.145  Although the independent judgment
rule as used in Strumsky has been applied primarily in cases involv-
ing continuation of public employment,1 40 and the right of a
probationary teacher to be rehired, 147 there is no reason to limit
application to these situations. The Bixby court implied that depri-
vation of livelihood or property would involve a fundamental
right. 48 At least one court has used the Bixby and Strumsky
decisions to conclude that a property owner has a fundamental
vested right in his property and that the creation of a new assess-
ment district substantially affects that right. 49 Since noncom-
plying service stations can be closed, it is arguable that the enforce-
ment of the APCD's rules infringes fundamental vested rights
belonging to the oil companies.
If a California court applies the independent judgment rules in
the vapor recovery situation, it may find that the technology is not
sufficiently developed to require installation of the vacuum sys-
tems. 50  The court should take note, however, that any funda-
mental vested right possessed by the oil companies should be bal-
anced against the right of the public to breathe clean air. The oil
142. Id. at 144, 481 P.2d at 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
143. Id.
144. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
145. Id. at 45, 520 P.2d at 40-41, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17.
146. E.g., Valenzuela v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 40 Cal. App. 3d
557, 115 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1974).
147. E.g., Young v. Governing Bd., 40 Cal. App. 3d 769, 115 Cal. Rptr.
456 (1974).
148. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144-46, 481 P.2d 242, 252-53, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 234, 244-45 (1971). The Bixby court also approvingly quoted the
court in Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 259
Cal. App. 2d 306, 316-17, 66 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1968), to the effect that
an individual has a vested right in being permitted to continue operating
an existing business. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 145, 481 P.2d 242, 253,
93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 245 (1971).
149. Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 49 Cal. App. 3d 816, 831, 123
Cal. Rptr. 320, 329 (1975), hearing granted, S.F. No. 23341 (Sept. 4, 1975).
See also Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
150. See note 132 supra.
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companies have had three years to develop vapor recovery systems
capable of meeting the APCD's recovery requirements. Since sev-
eral developers now produce limited quantities of vacuum systems
the technological problems involved cannot be insurmountable.
Agency actions cannot effectively force technology if they can be
avoided. Because of the congressional mandate to clean the air
as quickly as possible the courts and other agencies should support
these actions.
EPA Revisited
On October 9, 1975, the EPA followed the lead of the San Diego
APCD and implemented vapor recovery requirements for ten met-
ropolitan air basins. 151 These rules virtually assure that the
vacuum systems will be installed in at least 56 percent of the serv-
ice stations in these areas.152 Although the rules do not directly
affect the San Diego area, they demonstrate EPA's support and em-
phasize the necessity for vapor recovery.
The San Diego APCD set standards which required the develop-
ment of new technology. The APCD allowed adequate lead time
to accomplish this goal and provided sanctions for failure to comply
or to contribute to the development of the necessary technology.
The reluctance of private developers to mass produce equipment
which may never be used has contributed to successful resistance
to the APCD rules. The EPA announcement should eliminate de-
veloper reluctance by creating a large market for vacuum systems.
Developers now have the opportunity to produce vacuum systems
with relative assurance that they will be sold. The EPA rules
151. The rules will affect over 37,000 service stations in metropolitan Los
Angeles, Sacramento Valley, San Joaquin Valley, metropolitan Denver,
metropolitan Baltimore, metropolitan Boston, parts of New Jersey, and the
District of Columbia and surrounding areas in Maryland and Virginia. 40
Fed. Reg. 47673 (1975) ; L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
152. 40 Fed. Reg. 47668 (1975); L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, § 2, at 6, col.
1. The EPA rules divide gasoline service stations into three categories. Sta-
tions pumping 30,000 gallons or more per month must install devices
capable of 90 percent efficiency. Stations pumping between 10,000 and
30,000 gallons must install devices of 80 percent efficiency. Smaller stations
are exempt from the rules. Installation must be complete by 1977. The
explanation of the regulations by the EPA administrator indicates that only
the vacuum systems have the potential for 90 percent efficiency. 40 Fed.
Reg. 47668 (1975).
should also lessen the political pressure placed on the legislative
section of the APCD, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors.
The EPA announced the new rules at a press conference in San
Diego to put the oil companies on notice that it supported the San
Diego APCD's actions and that it expected other communities to
follow suit.5 3
In many areas every available method must be used to control
hydrocarbon emissions in order to meet the 1977 deadlines.1 4
The primary consideration behind the setting of standards must be
the achievement of the health-based primary ambient air quality
standards.155
CONCLUSION
In 1970 Congress finally recognized the urgent need for clean air
and endorsed the concept of forcing technology. The supporters
of the Clean Air Act, however, did not foresee industry-wide resist-
ance to the development of environment saving technology. In the
area of vapor recovery the resistance has taken two forms. First,
the oil companies refused to comply with the APCD rules. Second,
when sanctions appeared imminent the oil companies challenged the
APCD's authority and technology-forcing actions in the courts. Al-
though recent EPA actions make implementation of vapor recovery
in several major cities fairly certain, the courts will initially decide
how long such implementation will take and the degree of vapor
recovery requirable. There has been too little change, however, in
our air quality since 1970 to justify the delay of any significant
air pollution strategy. Thus, the San Diego APCD rules to force
the development and implementation of effective vapor recovery
equipment should be upheld.
McnAE F. WALSH
153. L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, § 2, at 6, col. 1.
154. 4G Fed. Reg. 47668 (1975).
155. Id.
